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Abstract
I propose a novel model of the human ego (which I
dene as the tendency to measure one's value based
on extrinsic success rather than intrinsic aptitude or
ability). I further propose the conjecture that ego so
dened both is a non-adaptive by-product of evolu-
tionary pressures, and has some evolutionary value
as an adaptation (protecting self-interest). I explore
ramications of this model, including how it mediates
individuals' reactions to perceived and actual limits
of their power, their ability to cope with risk and
uncertainty, and how this model may interpolate be-
tween rational choice models and cognitive psychol-
ogy. I develop numerous examples and applications,
including poverty traps, to demonstrate the model's
predictive power to elucidate a broad range of social
phenomena.
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An extraordinary exchange has taken place in re-
cent decades between psychology and other social
sciences, particularly economics. Neoclassical eco-
nomics traditionally modeled people's behavior in
the economic arena by assuming they make decisions
rationally { an assumption exposed increasingly to
revision based on observational evidence [1], most
notably with groundbreaking work by psychologists
such as Kahneman [2]. At the same time, and per-
haps even more remarkably, the simple deductive as-
sertion that much behavior ought to serve rational
ends { grounded in the observation that optimization
may provide its bearer with advantages (both evolu-
tionary and economic) { has begun making inroads
in social science [3, 4, 5] and psychology. The advent
of evolution-based approaches to psychology [6, 7, 8]
led to serious consideration of the hypothesis that
behavior often serves adaptive purposes [9, 10, 11].
Rational choice has been invoked as an explana-
tion in a broad range of social phenomena [4, 5],
while psychological egoism argues that all behavior
is ultimately motivated by self-interest [12, 13]. Con-
sideration of the idea that rationality and economics
can strongly inuence sociology dates at least to We-
ber, Marx, and even Adam Smith [14, 15, 16]; cer-
tainly, self-interest and material wealth factor into
many arenas of human and social behavior. For in-
stance, Harold Lasswell's celebrated denition of pol-
itics as \who gets what" clearly involves self-interest
and the distribution of valued resources. And eco-
nomics and resource scarcity notably gure in expla-
nations for armed conict and strife [17].
Yet observed behavior is not always rational. Be-
havioral economics has been applied to understand
consumer and labor behavior, even when these de-
part from the normative expectations of economics
and rational choice theory [1, 2, 18, 19]. Behavioral
insights such as prospect theory have been applied
to elucidate explanations of outstanding problems in
economics [1].
An evolutionary psychology perspective con-
tributes further to an understanding of irrational-
ity by clarifying that cognitive and behavioral pro-
cesses can be adaptive, at least for problems com-
mon in an evolutionary context, yet simultaneously
be sub-optimal in a modern, organized, technology-
based economy. In particular, behavior (including
apparently irrational behavior) results from a rich,
bi-directional interplay between genes, environment,
and culture, and evolved universal tendencies may
or may not t the exigencies of a given, proximate
environment [7, 6, 8]. Evolutionary psychology has
had successes in explaining many phenomena, while
challenges remain [6].
Psychologists agree that self-esteem is pervasive,
important, and can aect behavior [20, 21, 22]. Yet
many aspects of self-esteem remain controversial or
mysterious, including the relative importance of self-
esteem as a temporary state vs. permanent trait, as a
sum of bottom-up parts vs. a top-down whole, and as
a cognitive vs. aective process [23, 24]. Two com-
peting explanations have been presented for why hu-
mans are motivated to grow and protect self-esteem:
terror management theory (TMT) [20] and sociome-
ter theory [25]. The present work hopes to shed light
on how the self-esteem instinct works in practice, in-
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cluding its relationship to rationality.
1.1 Research question
\You call these baubles, well, it is with
baubles that men are led.... Do you think
that you would be able to make men ght
by reasoning? Never.... The soldier needs
glory, distinctions, and rewards."
-Napoleon Bonaparte, speaking about hon-
oric rewards given to members of the Le-
gion of Honor [28].
The concept of human rationality, as referenced
in the present work, diers somewhat from most of
the psychological literature on rationality [1, 10, 29],
where it typically refers to whether people solve logic
problems correctly, or whether they make isolated
economic decisions as would be predicted by neo-
classical economic theory. Instead, here I use ra-
tionality in a more generalized economic and polit-
ical sense of acting in one's self-interest.1 Thus the
present work is motivated, in part, by a very funda-
mental question, inspired by economics: why might
people behave in ways contrary to their own adap-
tive self-interest, even when it should be possible to
learn over time from mistakes?2 How can they some-
times have trouble even recognizing behaviors in their
own self-interest? And more specically, why do peo-
ple engage in over-sensitive behavior? Why do they
at times pay inordinate attention, even to the point
of obsession, to points that apparently have no eco-
nomic or practical relevance to their lives?
The question is vividly exemplied by the well-
known quote above, showing that Napoleon (cynical
or not) claimed a reliable, repeatable eect wherein
large numbers of French conscripts (some of whom
had perhaps revolted for democracy a few years prior)
1This construct of rationality is similar to psychological and
rational egoism. Note that I treat rational and adaptive behav-
ior as closely-related ideas. But here I go beyond narrowly con-
strued self-interest and ask why some behavior is maladaptive,
i.e. serving no apparent self-interested or altruistic purpose.
2Simply dividing the mind into aective and deliberative
systems leaves it moot whether and how the older aective
system protects adaptive self-interest, or deals with risks.
could be motivated by \baubles" to wage war on be-
half of empire. By Napoleon's admission, \reason-
ing" would not suce to motivate soldiers to risk
their lives for his expansive campaigns, yet \baubles"
symbolizing \glory" could.
Similarly, another key mystery I explore here is
voluntary under-investment in one's own human cap-
ital, or that of one's close kin [1, 35, 30]. For ex-
ample, why would a person consistently opt against
educating oneself or one's children, starting a busi-
ness, or training for a more rewarding career, even
if such investments are clearly worthwhile? By the
same token, why would one over-invest in oneself,
erroneously assuming (again like Napoleon) that one
cannot fail? Why would even a professionally success-
ful individual hesitate to make a career or life change?
Why are more fortunate individuals observed to feel
less empathy [31] towards misfortunate ones?
The present work explores a hypothetical response3
to the above: that human behavior can be analyzed
rationally (at least insofar as straightforward logical
models can capture the complexities inherent in \act-
ing in one's self-interest"). Conversely, apparently
irrational behavior becomes likely when uncertainty,
risk, and ambiguity [5, 32] are dominant considera-
tions (as well as the need to prioritize and conserve
energy [11, 10]). The rational explanations I oer in-
volve self-image (the perception of one's likelihood to
succeed) and risk (the adverse consequences of fail-
ure). Yet the whole is more than the sum of these
parts: I hope to illuminate how adaptive consider-
ations, mediated by cognitive dissonance, result in
non-adaptive behavior.
In this work, I present a model of the ego as a pow-
erful evolutionary instinct that may help explain in
rational terms much otherwise mysterious behavior.
I propose that studying ego, in the model concep-
3This work may be understood as an attempt to probe the
limits of a `radically rational' model of human behavior, a
homo economicus [3] or even politicoeconomicus. Note such
limits clearly do exist: Kahneman [29] wrote despite criticism
by rational choice theorists and others, that irrationality re-
search \merely rejects an extreme thesis that would attribute
rationality to every belief and act." And even Tooby and Cos-
mides [11] concurred, writing \[r]ational behavior is not, in any
sense, the state of nature." A middle ground is proposed here:
to analyze irrationality with adaptive/rational considerations.
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tualized here, is worthwhile because it addresses the
interaction between individuals' desires and external
reality. As such, it can tell much about how individu-
als cope with, and react to, limitations of their locus
of control (i.e., their perceived power to shape their
environment according to their own preferences), as
well as how they cope with their own vulnerability. In
what follows, I seek to demonstrate that this model
possesses parsimony of assumptions and, in Sec. 5,
that it has general applicability.
Some have protested that the assumptions of evo-
lutionary psychology can be replaced by a domain-
general stipulation of rationality [6]. Yet I propose
that an evolutionary perspective on ego can be useful
to explain and motivate both irrational and rational
behaviors through a lens of rational considerations.
As formulated here, ego paradoxically is both ratio-
nal and irrational, both adaptation and by-product {
much like human behavior more generally [6, 7]. By
referencing ideas such as cognitive dissonance (CD),
operant conditioning, and ego depletion, I hope the
present work can also help bridge the gap between
cognitive and evolutionary psychology.
Sec. 2 summarizes the central thesis and denitions
in this work, while Sec. 3 elaborates on the connection
to evolutionary psychology and Sec. 4 on the connec-
tion to the theory of cognitive dissonance. Although
this is a largely speculative work, as evidenced by the
large number of hypotheses presented, Sec. 5 applies
the ideas developed here to many practical examples,
thereby demonstrating their predictive power.
2 Ego: theoretical framework
2.1 Denition
To make the model of ego precise, I seek to dene
precisely the central term. Ego is dened here as:
Denition 1 Ego is measuring one's own value
based on extrinsic success, rather than intrinsic ap-
titude or ability. Further, the self-worth determined
in this way is used to assess one's future possibilities
and therefore to make decisions.
The decisions alluded to here as being aected by
ego could include, e.g., decisions to make human cap-
ital investments in oneself, or to take life risks such
as pursuing dicult-to-attain goals.
Note that this denition is already somewhat novel,
and is a crucial part of this work (see, however,
Ref. [23] and the discussion in Sec. 2.3). At the same
time, the denition overlaps with many existing con-
cepts and is quite natural (to be illustrated and elab-
orated in Sec. 2.3 below).
The meaning of \success" here is deliberately left
subjective. Modern human goals are framed and mo-
tivated by evolutionary instincts, even if they do not
cleave to a purely evolutionary mandate [8]. Thus
I propose that, when indulging their egos, humans
tend to gauge their own \tness" by measures that,
broadly speaking, correlate with extrinsic economic
and reproductive outcomes.4 By the same token,
the focus of Denition 1 is especially on success as
it is measured directly by evidence from the senses.
Thus, for some individuals, consumption, whether in
the form of \retail therapy" [26] or gastronomy, may
provide a more immediate boost to the ego than does
saving [18, 19].
Finally, it is interesting to note that Denition 1
fails to dierentiate between failure caused by inci-
dental circumstances vs. failure by one's own fault
{ e.g., because the original aspiration was wrong or
unworkable, or because of one's lack of ability. In
practice, when circumstances are inauspicious, this
question of fault may be irrelevant, and ego may in
4To understand how Def. 1 ts into the traditional frame-
work of selectively contingent self-esteem [23], consider an
analogy to the economic concept of trade. Suppose, for in-
stance, one possesses a good or skill one doesn't value oneself,
but which is valued by the broader market. One can then
trade this possession for something one does value. Similarly,
one may value one's own particular attributes to a greater or
lesser degree [8, 23], yet still receive a `transactional' ego boost
from possessing attributes that are more broadly or culturally
valued.
Moreover, with regard to domains on which ego is not con-
tingent, one protects one's ego on the grounds that one has
limited energy available. That is, one reduces CD by recalling
that one has chosen not to prioritize a particular endeavor in
one's life (see Hypothesis 8 below). Whereas if this endeavor
becomes relevant to one's life, one could then devote eort to
it, and be more successful at it. Thus, the ego model can t
consistently with the paradigm of selectively contingent self-
esteem.
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fact oer an advantage by discouraging wasted ef-
fort. Nevertheless, the distinction often is crucial,
and the ego is awed inasmuch as it fails to distin-
guish between an outcome vs. a possibility (by exten-




Hypothesis 1 Ego (as in Denition 1) is a strong,
innate instinct. It originates both as an evolution-
ary adaptation (protecting self-interest) and as a non-
adaptive response to evolutionary pressures.
Arguably, every decision we make involves the ego,
and therefore ego touches on every aspect of our lives.
But at the same time, ego inhibits risk-taking and
living one's most compassionate, dynamic, innovative
life.
An alternative or complementary perspective on
Hypothesis 1 is the following:
Hypothesis 2 In Denition 1, the phrases \one's
own value" and \self-worth" could be understood to
mean one's self-assessment of one's own evolutionary
tness.
Hypothesis 2 implies that evolution has \imprinted"
on us the fear of being reproductively unt, so that we
tend to perceive even mundane, modern challenges
through this frame. While Hypothesis 2 is not self-
evident from Def. 1, it does help account for the se-
riousness individuals sometimes impart to seemingly
minor threats or successes, which can become imbued
with evolutionary overtones of life and death. This
will be explored more fully in Sec. 3 below.
2.3 Discussion, illustrations, and re-
lated literature
In this section I expand and clarify Def. 1 with both a
review of related literature, and illustrative examples.
Def. 1 aects one's locus of control and thereby
one's pursuit of life goals, including one's openness
to risks. This \feedback loop" among ambitions, ego,
and outcomes may be self-reinforcing. In addition to
causing a possible \poverty trap" [18, 30], this \loop"
resembles taking a Bayesian statistical approach to
one's own life possibilities, i.e., revising one's concep-
tion of oneself in response to observed life outcomes.5
Def. 1 might further be understood with reference
to the \just-world hypothesis" [36] or to the common
expression, \it is hard to argue with success."
Similarly, snobbery [27] and exclusivity (e.g., the
medieval `divine right' of royalty and aristocracy)
have much in common with Def. 1 of ego. The ex-
istence of such attitudes benet favored groups, who
are assumed to deserve favored social and economic
status by virtue of some (often ill-dened) innate su-
periority. However, for the purposes of the present
work, it is particularly interesting to speculate that
such attitudes exist and are widespread precisely be-
cause human psychology has evolved to accept { and
expect { dominant individuals and groups [8]. By
the same token, nationalism and xenophobia also em-
phasize favored (co-ethnic) in-groups, yet may do so
for defensive reasons, as political units such as the
nation-state may function largely to protect civilians
from invading foreigners [37]. Thus by protecting in-
dividuals and groups who would otherwise be threat-
ened, nationalism and xenophobia may provide an
ego boost according to Def. 1 and Hypothesis 2.
In modern capitalist economies, some observers see
a \meritocracy" where those who enjoy economic suc-
cess probably deserve it because of their merit. Ar-
guably this view reects contingent ego, as genotypic
merit is presumed to correlate strongly with pheno-
5For example, suppose one's \true" genotypic abilities are
unknown even to oneself, and therefore modeled by a random
(scalar or vector) variable  with a probability distribution
(). Positive and negative life events (as gauged by the af-
fect they produce) can revise one's estimate of . Now if one
wishes to make an investment in oneself such as attending a
university, one's rational consideration of the risks and payos
of this decision will be aected by . In eect, the likelihood
of success in a new endeavor depends sensitively on the likeli-
hood  that one is \capable enough" to succeed. Both the risk
of failure and the expected payo can depend on , such that
even attempting the investment may seem futile if one believes
success to be limited or precluded by one's own ability level
and/or power. Positive or negative life events can shift  to
make self-investment appear more or less attractive, and thus
success and failure can be self-reinforcing.
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typic success [38, 39, 40, 41].
Attribution theory [22, 33, 31] addresses many of
the same themes as the present work, including dispo-
sitional vs. contextual attribution (i.e., explanations
of behavior favoring personal traits vs. context), and
self-perception theory and its association with per-
ceived control. The present work elaborates on these
ideas, exploring the connection of Def. 1 with evo-
lutionary psychology as a largely unconscious, pow-
erful, and innate phenomenon. Def. 1 is similar
to attributional ego or egotism [22] for the positive
case, where both predict individuals take credit when
successful, but attributional ego appears opposite in
the negative case, where it predicts individuals avoid
blame for failure. Unlike attribution theory, here I
posit that ego remains active for either positive or
negative events, and that contextual self-perception
functions to defend against threats to ego.
There exists a sizable literature in a closely related
concept, contingent self-esteem, which is dened as
self-esteem that is contingent on meeting external
standards [20, 34]. While this denition is very sim-
ilar to 1, in practice contingent self-esteem may be
used as a proxy for the fragility of self-esteem.6 The
present work, by contrast, puts emphasis on the con-
tingent source rather than strength of self-esteem.
More fundamentally, Denition 1 emphasizes that
ego depends on outcomes of economic/evolutionary
relevance7. For example, in the spirit of rational
choice theory, a person experiencing a workplace or
political argument seeks support of others, not just
for validation, but because such support improves the
political position and likelihood of prevailing. Like-
wise, a person tends to seek professional recognition
because of the advantages it brings to his/her ca-
reer. Thus, even at an unconscious level, ego de-
pends on life outcomes in response to their perceived
relevance. Moreover, in the present conceptualiza-
tion, (extrinsic) ego is a universal instinct, cannot
be eliminated, and is thus applicable to analyze all
6E.g., consider measures such as [34] \If I am told that
I look good, I feel better about myself in general" and \An
important measure of my worth is how well I perform up to
the standards that other people have set for me."
7Cf. Goldthorpe's [5] discussion of universal situational
rather than personal factors in decisions, and Gilbert [8].
people, not only those with fragile self-esteem. Ac-
cordingly, the present concept of ego need not imply
sensitivity and passivity: one may strive for a posi-
tive outcome, and still feel ego pressures, which are
typically made all the stronger by one's investment
of self. Additionally, the present work treats posi-
tive and negative outcomes more evenly, in that the
ego is not only bombarded by negative life events,
but can also grow inordinately large in response to
desired outcomes [22, 35, 31].
An even more important dierence is that ego is
not exactly self-esteem, rather more of a pragmatic
yardstick of one's power, and is therefore inter-related
with desire, greed, fear (see Hypothesis 6 below), etc.
For the present purposes, 1 can be considered to de-
ne ego. That is, the model presented here denes a
construct but then shows that this construct is useful
for predicting cognition, aect, and behavior in many
cases. By contrast, despite broad consensus that self-
esteem is important, psychological literature remains
ambivalent over fundamentals like why we need self-
esteem [20, 25], and nds little evidence for associa-
tion between self-esteem and behavior, while simul-
taneously failing to tap self-esteem's full explanatory
potential for behavior [23]. Even theories explicitly
considering self-esteem's grounding in a desire for
\literal or symbolic immortality" [20] neglect ego's
source in that very ubiquitous, biologically-ingrained
craving for `longevity' { passing on our genes to the
next generation { and the concomitant reproductive
tness concerns, selection pressures, and powerful di-
rect implications for behavior.
Within the contingent self-esteem literature,
Crocker and Wolfe [23] have proposed a model simi-
lar to Def. 1, where self-esteem is contingent on per-
sonally signicant events, and inuences behavior.
Based on this, they aim to resolve controversies and
explain social problems' connection with self-esteem.
The present work is in many ways complementary to
[23]. It diers by emphasizing ego's interplay with
rationality, as well as explicitly assuming the con-
tingency of ego is innate, and exploring the connec-
tion via Hypotheses 1 and 2 to evolutionary psy-
chology, risk, and CD in detail. And as discussed
above, here I emphasize ego's contingency on eco-
nomic/evolutionary success and factors socially ac-
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cepted as relevant to it [8]. Whereas Crocker and
Wolfe do write that \Broad, superordinate contingen-
cies of self-worth ... are not likely to change easily or
quickly," they focus their analysis more on personally
variable bases of contingency [23].
Likewise, Tooby and Cosmides [7] give an example
connecting self-esteem to sexual jealousy that touches
on many of the same ideas explored here. However,
they do not explicitly state a general, innate relation-
ship between self-esteem and extrinsic factors, nor
do they elaborate on self-esteem's connection to risk,
risk-aversion, and cognitive processes like CD and op-
erant conditioning. In any case, little previous work8
has addressed in any detail the ramications of con-
tingent self-esteem and their explanatory and predic-
tive power for a broad range of behavior.
The denition of ego given here may be most
closely related to Buddhist religious thought, which
has explored the human ego deeply, with special em-
phasis on alternatives to egoistic thinking. Consider
the following quote, spoken by a Zen Buddhist master
[42]:
The spider dances her web without
knowing that there are ies who will get
caught in it. The y, dancing nonchalantly
on a sunbeam, gets caught in the net with-
out knowing what lies in store. But through
both of them `It' dances.
In evolutionary terms, this Buddhist master seems
to recognize that spider and y are part of a sin-
gle complex ecosystem (`It') including symbiosis and
altruism together with competition. It is also inter-
esting to note that Buddhism emphasizes the value
of compassion in contradistinction to ego [8]; it is im-
mediately apparent from 1 that ego encourages neg-
ative judgement of others who suer misfortune, and
therefore impedes compassion. Finally, Buddhism
also stresses giving up or losing one's ego as a path
to greater success, for example in various arts [42].
In the language of the present work, this might be
8The work of Crocker and Wolfe [23] is an exception to
this rule. As they write: \In our view, behavior is motivated
more by actual or potential uctuations in self-esteem around
a person's typical level than by whether that level is typically
high or low."
understood as the realization that failure does not
equate with death, and therefore one is free to take
risks. Despite these many similarities, Buddhism dif-
fers from the present work in that it does not tra-
ditionally study the ego rationally, and indeed Bud-
dhist tradition often disparages rationality as insu-
cient or incapable of attaining enlightenment, some-
times instead making use of riddles and paradoxes to
shock the adherent's mind out of rational thinking.
Likewise, Stoic ethical and religious philosophy
presents alternatives to egoism, while being highly
concerned with rationality [43]. However, Stoicism
traditionally frames irrationality and emotions as er-
rors of judgement [43]. It further lacks the benet
of modern cognitive insight (such as a well-developed
theory of CD), and as such, is closer to a prescriptive,
rather than descriptive, philosophy.
I noted in Sec. 2.1 that ego erroneously conates
outcomes with potential. I should note that epige-
netic eects whereby acquired traits can be passed on
to ospring [44], the Baldwin eect wherein learned
adaptations aect natural selection [45], and gene-
culture coevolution [46] or the complex interplay be-
tween environment and human nature acknowledged
by evolutionary psychologists [6] all give some jus-
tication for organisms to measure their self-worth
by extrinsic success in a dynamic environment rather
than by intrinsic qualities. Nevertheless, it is still er-
roneous to measure potential this way, since outcomes
are, for these very reasons, not xed, predetermined
functions of one's \tness."
2.4 Risk-reward calculations
Virtually everything I discuss in this article can be in-
terpreted from an adaptive-evolutionary perspective
in terms of mitigating uncertainty and limiting risk:
Hypothesis 3 Egoistic thinking tends to favor risk-
aversion.
Since ego, as modeled in Def. 1, is measured by ex-
trinsic outcomes, and particularly by overt informa-
tion from the senses, it is a fundamentally risk-averse
trait. In a fundamental way, the misattribution of
credit or blame to oneself, for outcomes partly de-
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pendent on luck, tends to encourage conservatism to-
wards risks.
One way to understand Hypothesis 3 is the follow-
ing: in Def. 1, ego is determined by one's extrinsic
success, and determines, in turn, one's assessment of
future life possibilities. Interpreting these facts from
a \systems" point of view { ignoring the individual's
feelings and considering only inputs and outputs {
we see Def. 1 is a mechanism by which people tend
to base expectations of the future on extrinsic reali-
ties, as opposed to hopes and aspirations. Def. 1 has
little tolerance for \could have, would have, should
have," rewarding only results one can see and mea-
sure. Such thinking is onerously risk-averse, trusting
only what is observably true, and leaving little hope
that new outcomes may be possible.
Moreover, in protecting one's ego, one seeks to pro-
tect one's emotional well-being, which goes beyond
merely eschewing risk to one'smaterial well-being (as
discussed in Sec. 4 below). Finally, there is a possible
adaptive reason for ego's connection to risk aversion,
since a more successful social position should gener-
ally provide a safer foundation to tolerate risk [35].
Note that strictly rational planning and decision-
making may well be ineective and even unattainable
strategies in human life, since complex and unantici-
pated factors can render a perfectly correct plan use-
less { or even dangerous { in practice. Thus, `the
best-laid plans of mice and men go oft awry.' De-
spite having advanced cognitive capabilities, humans
may typically treat prediction and planning as semi-
empirical problems { particularly when thinking in
intuitive or instinctual modes. This strategy of de-
pending on experience and highly evolved instinct
may reduce the risk of decision-making { but also
limit the rewards from taking well-chosen risks. In-
deed, to the extent that humans tend to consult an
\aect pool" and \aect heuristic" when making de-
cisions [47], it stands to reason their decisions would
reect tried-and-true experience, rather than innova-
tive risk-taking.
To elaborate further on how ego should suppress
risk-taking, consider a crude game theoretical model.
Let us imagine a world where people behave accord-
ing to the ego of Def. 1, and that all crave the same
risky life goal. Imagine, also, that this goal is attain-
able purely by luck, with success in just one try out of
ve. Then the majority who failed to attain the goal
on their rst try would internalize the failure, judg-
ing their future life possibilities as lower than those of
the minority who succeeded. They would perhaps be
unlikely to try again, particularly if doing so carried
costs. Although this model is admittedly exagger-
ated, it arguably captures much that's missing from
zero-sum political models, which emphasize all-out
competition for a few scarce resources.
In economics, self-control problems can prevent
workers from investing [1, 18, 19] optimally when pay-
os are delayed in time from the investment. Simi-
larly, in operant conditioning theory, training a long
and dicult behavior sequence is made much easier
by providing partial rewards during the course of the
sequence [48]. A simple adaptive-rational considera-
tion that can explain such apparently irrational ten-
dencies is the risk that a deferred payo will fail to
materialize.
By discouraging risk, ego could play a role in
poverty traps (Sec. 5.1) by making human capital
investments in oneself seem tenuous and uncertain
[30]. It may also encourage conformism and group-
think rather than independence by glamorizing com-
monly accepted measures and modalities of success.
And overreliance on ego could undermine the abil-
ity of dreams, ambitions, imagination, and plans to
materialize ideas into reality.
Note that the relationship between ego and risk-
aversion could be bi-directional, i.e. risk-aversion
could cause egoistic thinking. For example, in the
case of misfortune or dissatisfactory extrinsic out-
comes, a person might harbor a lower ego as a defense
mechanism against the risk of repeating a choice that
has led to such misfortunes. Thus, any discrepancy
between a person's intrinsic self-esteem and extrinsic
ego might be explained as a defense against risk.
Finally, I note that, in the present model, risk and
uncertainty act as natural counterweights to rational-
ity. That is, to the degree that an individual cannot
successfully inuence his or her environment, that be-
havioral options are unavailable that produce truly
desired outcomes, and that predicting consequences
of a choice is dicult, it appears unprotable to the
individual to invest energy in rational deliberation.
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3 Evolutionary perspective on
ego
In the debate over the purpose of self-esteem, so-
ciometer theory tends to interpret self-esteem as
adaptive [25], whereas Terror Management Theory
(TMT) sees it more as a by-product or reaction to
the \existential dilemma" of all humans [20]. Yet an
evolutionary psychology perspective allows the pos-
sibility that ego is both; indeed, Gilbert writes that
virtually all human characteristics have an adaptive
side but can be anachronistic in modern societies [8].
In this section, I largely agree9, considering in turn
the adaptive and non-adaptive characteristics of the
ego model from Sec. 2. In the process, I hope to il-
lustrate one way [11] that evolutionary models could
mediate the rationality debate [10].
3.1 Ego as an evolutionary adaptation
First I consider the possible adaptive functions of ego.
It is virtually certain that natural selection should
produce some adaptation that, like Def. 1, imparts
us with self-interest. Thus, broadly speaking, ego
can serve the evolutionary purpose of helping protect
the individual's interests, including when they con-
ict with the interests of others. As such, it is surely
reasonable that ego would be a strong instinct as in
Hypothesis 1, given how many of the adaptive prob-
lems we solve are in the service of our greater self-
interest. Note this adaptive value of ego is particu-
larly relevant in establishing the connection of human
behavior to rational egoism, and thus to rationality,
in the economic sense [11].
As discussed in Sec. 2.4, ego also could play the
role of preventing extraneous risk:
Hypothesis 4 Ego serves an adaptive purpose of re-
ducing risk. More precisely, ego is an evolved system
9This work has remained agnostic on the related question
of the origin of self-esteem or ego. Ultimately, it is possible
that existential fear similar to that hypothesized by TMT may
be more fundamental than competitive impulses, since fearing
death is arguably intrinsic to life itself, whereas competition
is a secondary eect of interactions among living organisms. I
hope to develop this idea in future work.
for mitigating and preventing risk.
The relationship of ego to risk will be explored further
in Sec. 4.2. Still, this is not to say ego is necessarily
optimally adapted for risks that occur in a modern
organized economy:
Hypothesis 5 Being an instinctual system, ego fa-
vors decision heuristics such as loss-aversion rather
than rational optimization [2, 10, 47].
The non-adaptive or sub-optimal side of ego will be
discussed further in Sec. 3.2 and Sec. 5 below. A re-
lated adaptive advantage of ego may be to conserve
mental energy by cutting o deliberation about too
many remote risks. Thus, ego is an evolved system
for conserving energy and avoiding risk by default-
ing to a safe option analogous to the reference point
of prospect theory [2, 1]; see the discussion around
Hypotheses 8 and 10.
As a result of this interplay between ego and en-
ergy, ego via CD reduction enables humans to cope
with their nite inuence over their environment.
In particular, they do so by accepting minimally-
risky `default' decisions when practical; CD reduction
helps convince them these outcomes are successes.
Paradoxically, such egoistic acceptance of the status
quo lulls humans into an exaggerated sense of power,
instead of an appreciation of their fortune to be sit-
uated in a relatively hospitable environment.
Moreover, the adaptive function of ego could be
related with a more basic cognitive process: learning
/ data-gathering. Accordingly, some direct evidence
for ego as an evolved system is provided by the theo-
ries of conditioned reinforcement and operant condi-
tioning [49]. Denition 1 parallels the innate learning
process via conditioned response [49], in that through
ego individuals train their expectations based on past
outcomes rather than intrinsic considerations. Driv-
ing this point home, studies of accidental reinforce-
ment on so-called `superstitious behavior' [50] (the
occurence of conditioned reinforcement randomly or
spuriously) show { mirroring 1 { that a reinforcing
outcome need not be logical in order to modify be-
havior. Thus operant conditioning theory lends sup-
port to the most prominent aspect of Denition 1:
namely, we have evolved to set our goals and expec-
tations based on observing outcomes, rather than on
9
a full cognitive understanding of how our behaviors
produce the desired outcomes.
Likewise, in evolutionary psychology [7, 6], learn-
ing is considered an intermediary between \nature"
and \nurture." That is, one learns from social and
other cues in one's proximate environment, but learn-
ing is enabled by an adaptive predisposition to such
cues. Thus, Def. 1 reects features, manifested in
both operant conditioning and evolutionary psychol-
ogy, of an innate self-interest instinct, coupled with
pliancy in the criteria dening success and the pa-
rameters of how to achieve it. I note also that this
brief sketch has been eshed out in rich detail by
Gilbert [8]. The \bullying self" described there may
be understood in our context as an attempt to bridge
the gap between one's inner self and others, or more
broadly between inner expectations and extrinsic life
outcomes (see Sec. 4).
The interpretation of ego as a strong adaptive in-
stinct is useful, but surely has limits. Egoistic and
ego-driven behavior, particularly when over-inated,
may also carry drawbacks for both the individual and
the species [17]. Specically, protecting the ego typi-
cally may prevent many from taking risks, which in-
terpreted broadly could include sharing possessions
of value, being more emotionally open and vulner-
able with others, and living more dynamic and full
lives. At the individual level, the ego is dicult to
satiate and trying to do so can incur real costs (some-
times very heavy ones). Societally, people who would
otherwise be generous or altruistic may be motivated
instead to greed to protect their egos, especially when
in combination with prisoner's dilemmas or the per-
ception of competition [51].
3.2 Ego as a by-product of evolution
Even to the extent that ego as dened by 1 may be a
universal characteristic, it need not always be adap-
tive. I propose that ego may also be understood as a
non-adaptive psychological response to the pressures
of evolution, and, more generally, of risk (particularly
the risk of death).
Accordingly with Hypothesis 2, a human's ego-
driven fear is, perhaps, that others are tter in the
evolutionary sense. A more sophisticated perspective
on Hypothesis 2 may be the following: as Tooby and
Cosmides point out, most human genetic variability
is adaptively neutral, and \one expects to nd that
heritable diversity is inversely proportional to adap-
tive importance" [7]. Thus, neutral genetic variabil-
ity is tolerated to a great degree during evolution,
but could be the raw material for adaptation when
selection pressures suddenly change [7, 52]. To the
extent that this fact is intuitively known to humans,
Hypothesis 2 implies fear that one's genetic unique-
ness or phenotypic circumstance could lead to \falling
behind" in the natural selection process. Therefore,
the ego fear of Hypothesis 2 could be understood as
concern that one's genetic variations from the popu-
lation as a whole, which are usually neutral, should
prove not to be negative as civilization and technol-
ogy produce accelerating adaptive pressures.
To illustrate, this might manifest as vague dread
when one faces unique personal problems; as aec-
tive comfort when one judges oneself \normal;" or
as smug satisfaction when one is \better o" than
others [54, 55]. All of these comparisons may well
be understood less as pre-emptive attacks on others
than as defensive responses to the frightening process
of natural selection, or what more poetically could
be called the \human condition" [20]. And in par-
ticular, hyper-sensitive ego might be understood as
an overactive response to selection pressures { due
perhaps to accelerated selection pressures that may
accompany increases in living standards in complex
civilizations.
Paradoxically, truly unpreventable losses10 may be
`excused' by the egoistic thinking embodied in Hy-
pothesis 2, whereas losses of one's own `fault' are
avoided at all costs { even if such exaggerated risk-
aversion leads to irrational decision-making. Con-
ceivably, egoistic fears might even rival the fear of
death, since natural selection rewards reproductive
success as opposed to longevity per se.
To the extent that ego is not adaptive, it is easier
to understand how its dictates promote irrationality.
Any observed over-activity of ego in contemporary
human civilizations may have several proposed ori-
10Cf. the induced-compliance paradigm in cognitive disso-
nance theory [56, 57].
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gins, owing to striking mismatches [7, 6] between our
evolved universal tendencies and our modern, indus-
trialized socioeconomic environment (note these are
intended as explanations not of ego, but of its over-
activity):
We live out of the rhythm for which we evolved.
The population density of earth is much greater
than during most of human evolution. More-
over, many features of modern economies, e.g.,
agriculture, R&D, education, job markets, and
factory work [19], require larger (and perhaps
riskier) delays between investment and payo
compared to hunting and gathering.
Evolutionary pace has increased as a result of
human civilization and technological innovation
[52]. We live in a highly competitive society, with
intense wealth and sociopolitical power concen-
tration and inequality encouraging competition
arguably more intense than in the environment
in which we evolved [53]. Even in pre-industrial
civilization, technological change could help ac-
celerate the pace of evolution [52] and interact
with culture [6].
Survival is not a direct preoccupation.
Citizens of modern, developed nations possess
far more wealth than throughout evolutionary
history [53], and their survival faces relatively
few risks. Exceptions include diseases, wars,
natural or human-originated environmental
disasters, and catastrophes (which might there-
fore interact with ego especially strongly). At
the same time, wealth depends on a complex
economy over which individuals exert little
control.
3.3 Discussion
I do not attempt to rank the relative importance of
these two mechanisms, but I suspect that both are
likely present to some degree. First, for the case of
ego as an adaptation, it is very reasonable that evolu-
tion has produced some form of adaptation to guard
one's self-interest. Any such adaptation will proba-
bly bear at least some resemblance to Denition 1.
Moreover, ego is observably a prominent feature of
the human psyche.
At the same time, I conjecture that ego as a non-
adaptive by-product should also be a substantial part
of the mixture, for two reasons:
 Pure psychologically egoistic theories contradict
observations of altruistic behavior [1, 13] and
have been argued to be sub-optimal for evolu-
tionary success of the species [12]. It is natural
that humans do not want to compete with peers
and loved ones { especially close kin { for scarce
resources.
 In the absence of strong evidence, it would be
overly adaptationist to assume ego is part of the
human psyche expressly for some denite pur-
pose [7]. Rather, natural selection is only one
factor inuencing human behavior [6], and is
subject to limitations and constraints such as en-
ergy [58]. Thus, humans are imperfectly adapted
to our environment and can experience pain and
dissatisfaction. It is to be expected that the
sometimes brutal vagaries of life in the wild in-
duce a psychological reaction to the pressures of
evolution [20].
However, note that the adaptation and by-product
mechanisms for ego are mutually compatible. Con-
sider the emotion of fear, which clearly has adaptive
and maladaptive facets [59]. Analogously, even to
the extent that ego as in Def. 1 is adaptive, spurring
individuals to greater accomplishment, ego can simul-
taneously have a maladaptive side, causing irrational
behavior.
A resolution to this paradox is that there is not
intense selection pressure on individuals to live their
highest-achieving possible lives, but rather merely to
achieve satiscing reproductive success. Moreover,
pursuing one's egoistic drive to achieve may have
benets, but also carries costs in terms of working
hard, coping with disappointments and anxieties, etc.
Thus, some amount of ego may be an adaptation en-
couraging achievement; but beyond some threshold
level of success, many individuals may respond to
ego by choosing energy-saving strategies, such as CD
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reduction, that could drive apparently non-adaptive
behaviors.
4 Relationship to cognitive dis-
sonance
I now examine the intimate relationship between the
ego model and the theory of cognitive dissonance
(CD) [57, 56, 60, 61]. Virtually all of this work can
be understood by reference to CD,11 which I conjec-
ture plays a cognitive, mediating role between one's
aspirations and extrinsic reality.
Broadly speaking, economic analysis is meaning-
fully and usefully framed in terms of risk, precisely
because humans have limited, nite power to shape
our worldly environment { and thus our lives are char-
acterized both by predictable regularities, and by de-
partures from predictability. That is to say, the very
concept of risk presupposes a default expectation of
safety, from which departures do occur.12
Similarly, CD may be adaptive inasmuch that we
can realistically expect our cherished possessions, sta-
tuses, and relationships { virtually parts of our iden-
tities { will continually remain with us. This ego-
istic expectation could form a powerful loss-aversion
heuristic, encouraging us to accumulate extrinsic suc-
cesses, and guard against the CD attendant to loss.
Likewise, we expect that plans and goals based in our
intrinsic self-esteem will succeed.
Given this framework, I propose that CD { un-
pleasant as it can be { performs the role of alerting
us to departures from such expectations, a necessary
step before we determine how to resolve these dis-
appointments, within our energy budget. Thus, in
adaptive terms: ego could conserve mental energy by
encouraging us to assume our possessions will remain
intact; whereas CD provides a parsimonious check on
this egoistic assumption.
There are several important pathways potentially
11Except for the evolutionary connection / motivation (al-
though the connection of CD to evolution has been studied to
a small degree [60]).
12It is perhaps unsurprising that humans take for granted
our reliance on a hospitable environment, even while measuring
our self-worth in terms of our relative power.
connecting ego, as in the present work, to CD. First,
Festinger's original theory posited that CD is pro-
duced proportionately to the number of dissonant
cognitions [57], which could essentially include any
costs or drawbacks faced while pursuing a particular
course of action { or by extension, along a given path
to one's long-range goals. Second and similarly, I pro-
pose that disappointments in the pursuit of life goals
also heighten CD, just as outcomes short of one's ex-
pectations produce CD according to the \eort justi-
cation paradigm" [56, 62]. In the next section I will
elaborate on these two pathways, with an emphasis
on how CD relates to threats to the ego.
Finally, as mentioned above, cognizance of risks
can necessitate corrective decision-making, which can
produce CD directly by the so-called \free-choice
paradigm" [56]. This pathway will be studied further
in Sec. 4.2, where I will examine how CD mediates
the ego's response to risks.
4.1 CD associated with threats to ego
CD is believed by some researchers to be related to
threats to one's ego or conception of self [61, 63]. In-
deed, I propose that CD can result when extrinsic
circumstances contradict [3] one's assessment of one-
self:
Hypothesis 6 Any variation between an individ-
ual's expectations and extrinsic outcomes can in-
duce CD, constituting a potential threat to the ego.
CD, ego, and threats may be so closely related as to
function as part of the same specialized \circuit" in
the sense often discussed in evolutionary psychology
[6, 11].
I note in particular that the expectations threatened
in Hypothesis 6 could be those based on intrinsic or
\genuine" self-esteem [23]. Thus, external events can
threaten the ego whenever they contradict expecta-
tions grounded in one's self-image. For example, if a
person holds a set of related cognitions, and circum-
stances call any of these cognitions into question, the
resulting CD may threaten the rest.
One classic method to induce CD is \unconrmed
expectations" or \eort justication," when individ-
12
uals pay heavy costs to attain outcomes or results of
a lower value [57, 56]. This suggests CD could re-
sult whenever extrinsic outcomes fall short of one's
expectations { or, by extension, one's desires. This
concept is closely related with the present work be-
cause any such CD from disappointed expectations
presents a potential threat to the ego, as in Hypoth-
esis 6. Specically, CD may result from a conict
between the cognition that one's ego had expected a
successful outcome, and the cognition that the out-
come failed to materialize, thereby threatening the
ego.
A fundamental postulate of CD is that dissonance,
e.g. from disappointed expectations, is uncomfort-
able, motivating individuals to reduce it [57, 64, 65].
Cognitive conict is known to produce unpleasant af-
fect, for example being processed in a region of the
brain that processes social pain [66, 54]. As we will
see in this and the next section, ego-related CD such
as in Hypothesis 6 { representing mere recognition of
a disappointment, but no plan to rectify the situation
{ can be challenging and unpleasant for an individual
to interpret, and cope with. In particular, in Def. 1 it
was asserted one's aspirations in life can be based in
the ego, which essentially extrapolates past outcomes
to future goals. CD from unconrmed expectations
may, thus, threaten the ego because new information
casts such plans into doubt.
Moreover, deciding how much to revise these ex-
pectations is a cognitive judgement call, requiring a
painful tradeo between the adaptive/rational desire
for success, and an energy-saving instinct to accept
any safe status quo:
Hypothesis 7 Revising one's life expectations can
bring about painful CD because doing so is itself a
decision.
That is, we revise our expectations based on new ev-
idence that contradicts our old expectations { not on
incontrovertible fact. Thus, it may be painful to `de-
cide' to let go of an old expectation because this is,
at least partly, a voluntary act contrary to one's de-
sires, which therefore produces CD.13 `Choosing' to
13Decisions can, in general, produce CD via the free-choice
paradigm, as discussed previously.
accept this new reality is essentially the process re-
ferred to by CD theorists as \dissonance reduction,"
or \attitude change."
In addition, drawbacks, obstacles, or opportunity
costs that we encounter along a path to pursuing life
goals can produce CD, as in the free choice paradigm,
especially if such costs or obstacles are unexpected.
Becoming cognizant of these setbacks along our cho-
sen path may call into question the decisions associ-
ated with the path, and thus the CD may cause us
to doubt or regret decisions and may threaten our
assessment of our own phenotypic success.
Moreover, Hypothesis 6 may be a mediating mech-
anism by which unhealthy ego growth occurs, as fol-
lows. The ego may function like a protective \shell"
or defense surrounding one's actual, vital interests.14
This expansive denition of interests triggers CD
whenever perceived (but not truly vital) interests are
threatened. Dissonant cognitions, in the form of ex-
trinsic evidence, may be perpetually weighed against
consonant cognitions, based, for example, in intrinsic
self-esteem. The ego itself thus needs to be main-
tained and is prone to injury.
I now wish to discuss how the perspective of Hy-
pothesis 6 ts within existing knowledge on CD.
4.1.1 CD and ego threats as co-adaptations?
This connection among CD, threats, and Denition
1 could ameliorate a debate between so-called \re-
visionists" such as Steele and Aronson, who believe
that CD originates from a threat to the ego, and the-
orists such as Festinger and Harmon-Jones, who be-
lieve CD results simply from contradictions among
cognitions [63, 61, 60, 57, 56]. In the conceptualiza-
tion of Steele, CD results from behaving in a way
14By the same token, Crocker and Wolfe [23] write \People
will generally try to avoid the drops in self-esteem and increases
in negative aect that follow from failing in domains on which
self-worth has been staked," and disappointment theory [62]
posits that individuals change their behavior to prevent dis-
appointment. As a concrete example, losing money or a pro-
fessional demotion may be understood as a vital threat, met
with physiological stress responses evolved for life-threatening
situations, despite the fact that the nancial loss is far from a
threat of imminent starvation or death.
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that threatens one's beliefs of oneself. However, by
Denition 1, one's ego can be threatened purely by
the occurrence of disappointing or unfortunate out-
comes, thus eliminating the need for a complex sense
of self that complicates Steele's explanation [60].
While the low-level origins of CD are not entirely
understood, a body of evidence favors Festinger's
original theory: that is, CD follows from cognitive
conict, which need not involve either threat or ego.
But such an understanding of CD at a low level
must surely permit moderately higher-level relation-
ships between CD and other psychological variables,
such as ego. Such a higher-level relationship be-
tween ego threat and CD (stemming from life de-
cisions, sacrices, or disappointments) may well have
(co-)adaptive signicance, as evolutionary psychol-
ogy recognizes the evolution of interdependent parts
within a single integrated functional design [7]. Sim-
ilarly, Harmon-Jones even suggests [57] that apply-
ing insight about CD toward other phenomena \will
likely benet those enterprises and lead to a more
cumulative psychological theory."
Accordingly, I proposed in Hypothesis 6 a strong
relationship among CD, ego, and threats. As well
as causing negative aect, CD from disappointment
could damage the ego, strengthening one's motiva-
tion to reduce CD. Moreover, CD's strength has al-
ways been understood to depend on the importance of
the various cognitions, so ego-related CD might be es-
pecially salient, since self-interested cognitions are of
the highest importance. The present work may thus
underscore CD's connection to self-interest,15 show-
ing how CD can be interpreted as a vital threat.
Finally, Harmon-Jones and others found that CD
is related with the intention to act [56]. An impor-
tant aspect of both Def. 1 and Hypothesis 7 is that
we use ego to gauge future possibilities and make de-
cisions, so the present discussion may be consistent
with Harmon-Jones' action-based perspective on CD.
Further, Gilbert [8] writes that we have evolved
tendencies to exhibit behavior patterns associated
15Still, if the conjecture that ego and CD are part of the
same \circuit" should prove wrong, this need not disrupt the
larger ow of the present section (e.g., the low-level evidence
may not support CD produced by an ego threat, but causality
can still ow from CD to the threat).
with either dominant or submissive roles, which are
triggered by the circumstances of our environment.
It seems reasonable that the expression or supression
of these innate behavior patterns would be associ-
ated with measurable changes in the brain's activity.
Thus, Harmon-Jones' measurements [56] of CD acti-
vating regions of the brain associated with the inten-
tion to act might be related with the decision to ex-
press or suppress such innate attitudes in response to
an ego change, and the subsequent associated behav-
ior. In the language of the ego model, we would say
that the CD caused by, for instance, losing a political
dispute activates a change in one's self-assessment (a
blow to the ego) which subsequently aects behav-
ior. In this scenario, behavior appropriate to one's
actual position in the group may be critically adap-
tive, whereas opportunities to improve one's position
are relatively rare.
4.2 CD mediates ego response to risks
The key concepts of risk and uncertainty { limita-
tions of our power and departures from predictabil-
ity { intermediate between rational choice theory and
egoism on one hand, and an aect-driven, irrational
model of psychology on the other.
Paradoxically, Hypothesis 2 implies a pressure to
measure one's genotypic value by one's phenotypic
success. Yet for any given genotype, many pheno-
types are possible depending on the inuence of ex-
ternal environment, the quality of decisions made,
random chance, etc., which we can collectively call
risk:
Denition 2 Risk can include any non-genotypic
(e.g., environmental) factor with the potential to
cause signicant variation in phenotypic outcomes.
Risk creates CD between the relative safety of a de-
fault decision (and the pleasure of conserving mental
energy) vs. the larger reward of taking a successful
risk.16 This CD can be exacerbated by a modern or-
16Broadly construed, this quandary is part of a classic eco-
nomic tradeo between production vs. consumption, \laziness"
vs. industriousness [19].
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ganized economy, which may exaggerate evolutionary
pressures by disproportionately rewarding economi-
cally successful individuals. In a risky environment,
rational calculation may lead to rational behavior,
but any attempt to conserve mental energy by reduc-
ing CD is likely to result in irrational decision-making
{ akin to Aesop's parable of the sour grapes.
Given ego's relationship with risk, correlations be-
tween CD and anticipated risk provide a second path-
way by which CD and ego interact.17 Quite gener-
ally, risks necessitate decision-making, and decisions
produce risks, accompanied by CD through the free
choice paradigm. Each CD-inducing opportunity cost
or drawback associated with some decision also poses
potential risk to the overall success of the decision.
In response, one may be tempted to reduce CD so
as to reduce unpleasant aect associated with CD, to
increase the subjective perception of safety, and to
protect the ego. Ironically, the risks accompanying
any given decision may well be external in origin, and
may be best mitigated by rational analysis.
Moreover, as in Hypothesis 7, when engaging in
risky or uncertain activity, any form of disappoint-
ment may cause CD, which in turn leads to doubt
that one's original expectation of a positive outcome
was accurate. Because we have dened ego as judg-
ing one's self-worth by extrinsic outcomes, this CD-
originated doubt can extend to doubts about one's
self-worth and blaming oneself for an extrinsic disap-
pointing occurrence. Such spurious self-blame may
lead to avoiding future risks in order to \protect one's
ego." Thus, ego and CD can cause excessively conser-
vative behavior, trapping people in risk-averse cycles
to avoid CD and self-blame.
The sketch above can serve to interpolate be-
tween cognitive psychology and Simon's [32] model
of bounded rationality. But in the present work,
unlike in bounded rationality, I emphasize that risk
can be more than a small correction to the assump-
tion of perfect information. Rather, risk includes
large, persistent dierences in phenotype, potentially
even aecting reproductive tness as in Hypothesis
17As noted in Sec. 4.1.1, such a high-level association be-
tween CD and ego could be adaptive. In the present discus-
sion, when CD from a decision threatens one's ego, one feels a
motivation to weigh prospective decision risks.
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Figure 1: (a) Bounded rational decision-making. (b)
In the present work, risk can still result in bounded
rational decisions, but it can also result in CD reduc-
tion and irrationality.
2. And such large risks, mediated by CD reduc-
tion, can result in the mis-application of heuristics to
make erratic, highly irrational decisions (see Fig. 1
and cf. Ref. [64]).
Viewed through an evolutionary lens, ego helps
safeguard individuals against risk. But an unhealthy
ego can lead to oversensitive, risk-averse behavior
aimed at protecting one's self-image rather than one-
self. Unhealthy ego can thus adversely aect life out-
comes and the ability to learn from positive and neg-
ative experiences.
4.3 Chance and the fundamental ego-
CD relationship
Ultimately, ego drives CD by emphasizing ckle ex-
trinsic success, rather than intrinsic worth. Ego as in
Def. 1 is an emergent, socially constructed [23] phe-
nomenon, reecting social position in equal measure
to abilities. For instance, what I refer to as \extrinsic
success" in Def. 1 can certainly include one's reputa-
tion and the opinions of others, who will always exert
some power over one in an interdependent economy.
Yet being grounded in phenotypic outcomes, this so-
cial construct may appear more practically relevant
to life outcomes than intrinsic or \genuine" self-image
(even if the latter is more accurate). This possi-
bly cynical outlook may motivate some to chase ego-
driven trappings of success, even if such pursuits are
less satisfying than intrinsically-motivated or \gen-
uine" goals.
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That is to say, success does not always follow one's
intrinsic or \genuine" expectations; indeed natural
selection can occur when a previously unimportant
characteristic suddenly becomes a limiting factor in
evolutionary success. Thus, humans' assessments of
their intrinsic worth may be deemed less relevant
than their actual success, which is partly determined
by luck or chance. The psychological eect of evo-
lution may be a cult-like xation with success that
does not question how success is attained.
5 Applications
In the present section, I apply the concepts devel-
oped throughout this work to a range of behavioral
and cognitive phenomena, illustrating these concepts'
predictive power and providing supporting evidence.
Of course, social scientic concepts can be multi-
faceted and overlapping, so I will not present the ego
model as a unique or monolithic explanation of these
applications. Yet the present model possesses parsi-
mony of assumptions and applicability to this broad
array of behaviors. Moreover, I claim that the ego
model improves the predictive precision of explana-
tions for these phenomena. The present work links
these diverse examples by emphasizing centrality of
the ego, showing that ego is not merely incidental to
a variety of situations but can be a crucial element
in many.
The ego model ignores our social, communal, and
collective side, and should not be taken for a full be-
havioral theory. Still, it is argued that egoism is a
deeply ingrained, and hence multifaceted and ubiq-
uitous, instinct.
5.1 Poverty traps
Perhaps the most distressing non-adaptive behavior
is any behavior that unnecessarily prolongs poverty.
Recent evidence suggests that behavioral poverty
traps [30] related to decision fatigue / ego depletion
(the high cognitive cost of multiple decisions) [18]
could exist, and are perhaps responsible for propa-
gating poverty over time [35]. Note this body of lit-
erature views individuals' economic decisions as ra-
tionally motivated, yet still makes use of behavioral
economics insights to suggest ways these traps could
be alleviated, including by modied behavior.
Ego could strongly interact with behavioral
poverty traps. For example, we can expect poverty to
have a long-term, deleterious eect on ego, saddling
the disadvantaged with a need to validate their worth
and abilities.18 Such feelings of inadequacy may man-
ifest as onerous risk-aversion, e.g. time-inconsistency
[1, 35] or focusing on present survival to the detri-
ment of optimally investing in a less certain future.
This could even extend to human capital investment,
as individuals with low ego could even consider edu-
cation a risky, unproven investment.
Such behaviors have indeed been hypothesized as
mechanisms of poverty traps [30] and also observed
[35] as characteristic of poverty.19 This hypothe-
sis is further supported by empirical evidence show-
ing high-achieving high school graduates from low-
income family backgrounds typically do not even
apply to selective colleges, even when nancial aid
would make such colleges more nancially aordable
to them than non-selective colleges [67].20
Paradoxically, then, low-income individuals appear
to treat investment in their own human capital as
something of an inferior good, failing to intensify
their investment despite subsidies that would sig-
nicantly increase their budget. Such sub-optimal
investment in oneself exemplies the overarching
claim hypothesized in the Introduction, that appar-
ently \irrational" behavior is made likely when un-
certainty and risk are dominant concerns. In the
present model, the mechanism mediating this is the
ego, which is fundamentally risk-averse. Subsequent
research into how targeted interventions can miti-
18This poses no major contradiction with the ndings of at-
tribution theory [31] that poverty encourages contextual self-
perception, as this would be a natural way to reduce CD and
protect the ego, yet the long-term attack from poverty could
still be present [23].
19Shah and Mullainathan [35] write that whereas scarcity
can engage humans to caution \too much, abundance might
engage us too little."
20The tendency of many such students to apply to just one
extremely selective college [67] may be seen as the height of
ego-driven behavior because it leaves the students' human-
capital investment decision utterly up to a single extrinsic col-
lege admissions event.
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gate this eect further corroborates the hypothesis
that uncertainty and perceived risk play a key role
in application decisions. For example, Hoxby and
Turner nd lowering application costs and providing
personally-tailored information on nancial aid and
graduation rates increase low-income students' likeli-
hood to apply and graduate [68].
I now examine some additional examples and con-
sider broader implications of the ego model related
to this discussion.
5.1.1 Cultural and family networks
One example of a risk that could inuence economic
decisions is the risk of displacement or loss of family
and cultural networks, even in the desirable case that
an attempt at upward socioeconomic mobility should
succeed. Fear of such a loss, and uncertainty about
what type of network would replace the existing ones,
could play a role in poverty traps. If geographic and
social mobility are perceived to mean damaging one's
familial and cultural ties, one may be bothered by
feelings of guilt, which could be particularly strong if
one perceives one will be left without support in case
anything goes wrong. Such a fear might be especially
salient if the networks themselves exert peer pressure
on the individual, and particularly if the networks
currently form an important source of emotional and
psychological support for the individual. For their
own part, the networks may remain committed to
social mobility in the abstract, but may neverthe-
less reexively fear geographic and social mobility
that threatens either group cohesiveness as a whole,
or cohesiveness of individual members to the group.
Such fears might be founded, if the networks are not
equipped to support or mentor the upwardly mobile
individual in the individual's new social context.
5.1.2 Fear of opportunity
As discussed in Sec. 4.1, an expansive ego may itself
be prone to injury, even if risks originate externally
or from random chance. This could potentially lead
one to fear pursuing economic opportunity, insofar as
one perceives opportunities as trials or tests of one's
genotypic worth (similarly to Hypothesis 2). Such
fear may be exemplied by the above discussion of
human capital under-investment.
This can be interpreted in terms of individuals' per-
ceptions of opportunities as `all-or-nothing' events:
that is, failure might be perceived as conrmation
of the original inequitable circumstances. Thus, the
more rare an opportunity and the higher the cost
of failure, the greater the egoistic dread it might in-
spire. This dynamic bears resemblance to the theory
of relative deprivation [69], in that during a period of
opportunity, dissatisfaction may actually rise.
The present work has drawn inspiration, in part,
from politics, and the observation that political in-
teraction is a ubiquitous human activity, involving
a combination of self-interested, cognitive, and aec-
tive modes of thought, and both individual and group
concerns. As such, the ego model is expected to be
applicable to phenomena with political ramications,
such as relative deprivation.
5.1.3 Discussion
The example of poverty traps raises several broader
ramications pertinent to the ego model.
First, I hypothesize that decision fatigue could in
fact have an adaptive function, limiting the number
of risky decisions individuals are willing to make.21
To support this hypothesis, consider that it is adap-
tive to expend much energy deliberating a decision
only if it carries real risk [59, 47]. When classify-
ing a decision as \safe," an individual automatically
expends little or no energy on the decision;22 thus de-
cision fatigue may prevent energy waste on low-risk
decisions. But fatigue also discourages making multi-
ple high-risk decisions (which might potentially inter-
act) whenever some decisions can be avoided, thereby
lowering total risk.
21Evidence that decision fatigue originates in physiological
limitations [18] is compatible with this hypothesis. Speci-
cally, Baumeister observes that self-control has adaptive bene-
ts, but acknowledges that deliberation clearly carries energy
costs [18]. To this I would add that costs, and worst-case risks,
are often diminished by simply avoiding extraneous decisions.
Thus, decision fatigue may have adaptive value in that it com-
pels individuals to allocate cognitive resources judiciously, and
limit inessential risks.
22As an extreme example, consider the \decision" to eat
store-bought food grown by strangers.
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In a high-risk decision, a mistake in deliberation
could be dangerous. Thus a safe default option is to
avoid the decision and maintain the status quo (loss
aversion).
Hypothesis 8 By favoring conservative behavior
leading to extrinsically obvious rewards and cognitive
consonance, and discouraging avoidable decisions and
risks, ego may serve the adaptive function of conserv-
ing mental energy. The need to satisfy the ego may be
related with an innate instinct for economic/adaptive
success that is \dependable" and \safe." That is,
ego may be related to an instinct for success that is
maintained with minimal risk of loss, and therefore
with little expenditure of mental energy or decision-
making.
Furthermore, the emphasis in Hypothesis 8 on a
\safe" baseline state of wellbeing is reminiscent of the
reference point in Kahneman and Tversky's prospect
theory [2, 1]:
Hypothesis 9 Ego can be identied as the reference
point of prospect theory. CD is caused by negative
perturbations from the reference point, and CD re-
duction has a goal of minimizing such perturbations
while avoiding any permanent change to the reference
point.
This work could thus provide additional detail into
the mechanism of loss-aversion.
Seen in this light, \safety" of a reference point
is understandably important in human decision-
making: consider that the combinatorial complex-
ity [6] of decision-making would grow very fast with
the number of interacting sub-decisions. If some sub-
decisions can be considered \safe" and \settled" in-
dependently of the others, then they become non-
interacting. This potentially vastly reduces the men-
tal energy needed to make decisions, or to re-evaluate
one or more sub-decisions in light of updated infor-
mation. As noted in Sec. 2.4, intuitive and ego-
driven decision-making may be intrinsically conser-
vative strategies, limiting both the potential risks,
and rewards, of decisions.
Finally, Hypothesis 8 brings about the further in-
teresting possibility that rationalization is adaptive.
I claim that the determination of an eective ratio-
nalization is neither a haphazard process, nor is it
guaranteed to succeed. Thus, CD reduction could be
an adaptation that facilitates \fast and frugal" [10]
decision-making:
Hypothesis 10 When an individual wishes to ig-
nore the ego impact of a negative life event, engag-
ing in successful CD reduction/rationalization helps
lower the risk of ignoring this event (by providing sup-
plementary reasons to discount the CD). This helps
conserve mental energy by letting one avoid soul-
searching when changing goals.
Thus, when the fox in Aesop's fable refers to his
desired grapes as `sour,' he is justifying, not only
an assertion of being better o without them, but
also his decision (cf. Hypothesis 7) not to expend
further physical energy pursuing the grapes, or even
further mental energy debating the act. Likewise,
with reference to the discussion around Hypothesis 3,
the ease by which one successfully rationalizes one's
decision could reduce decision risk by providing sec-
ondary justication for an already-preferred, or pro-
posed, choice. As it relates to ego, CD reduction
could also reduce risk, as nding a ready explanation
for previous failure makes it appear safer to try again.
5.2 Low self-esteem
The present conceptualization of ego helps shed light
on the condition of low intrinsic self-esteem. It is of-
ten assumed that low self-esteem is internalized in a
global manner [77] { that one with low self-esteem is
complicit in one's globally low self-assessment. How-
ever, here I propose that this condition actually com-
prises a conict between healthy ambitions and de-
sires for oneself, and low ego or perceived locus of
control.23 Such a combination may produce resentful
anger and CD at the apparent discrepancy between
one's wishes and ability to actualize them, as in Hy-
pothesis 6.
23I emphasize again that ego is based on one's extrinsic suc-
cess, and is therefore highly sensitive to one's social position
and treatment by others (see Sec. 4.3). In particular, ego is
sensitive to whether extrinsic consequences { mediated by oth-
ers { appear fair and proportionate to one's decisions.
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In this model, the individual with low self-esteem
seeks extrinsic evidence validating an expectation of
better life outcomes. Perceived failures can further
damage the ego, making high expectations appear
unrealistic. In particular, low ego protects the in-
dividual from the risk of disappointments and the
risk of pursuing goals that actually are unrealistic.
Yet low ego does not, in practice, mean the low-self-
esteem individual lowers his/her desires and expec-
tations. As a result, the individual can suer from
chronic CD from a clash between a low extrinsic ego
(essentially, locus of control) and a higher intrinsic
self-esteem (intrinsic expectation of positive life out-
comes). Such CD, particularly if reinforced by unde-
sired life outcomes, can engender anger and painful
inner debates between risk-taking or accepting a more
conservative, ego-driven status quo. Thus, some in-
dividuals may have diculty raising self-esteem or
taking life risks, as doing so is both empowering and
frightening, and may entail possible further damage
to the ego.
This model makes predictions potentially diering
from a model of globally internalized low self-esteem.
For example, the ego model may imply that low self-
esteem is related with resentful feelings, an impetus
to `prove' oneself capable, etc.
The data of Zahn et al. on depressive patients is
broadly consistent with these assertions. Zahn et
al. found a large majority of the total sample (>80%)
blaming themselves more than others, roughly half of
the sample experiencing anger at either themselves
or others, and roughly half of this subsample expe-
riencing anger towards others at least as strongly as
towards themselves [77]. Thus, clinical data may con-
rm that many patients who blame themselves nev-
ertheless feel some generalized form of anger.
5.3 Envy
The emotion of envy is often understood [78] as sim-
ple desire for something possessed by another. How-
ever, I propose that envy is especially painful due to
the involvement of CD and ego. For example, envy
can result from the perception that another, who is
no more deserving [54, 55] than oneself, nevertheless
possesses something better. In this model, the con-
icting cognitions that: (i) the other is not perceived
to \deserve" success; and (ii) the other is observed to
attain success can trigger CD. While I am aware of
little previous literature explicitly linking envy and
CD, this model does nd empirical support in the
work of Jankowski and Takahashi [54], who observed
that envy is associated with CD.
The strength of CD and negative aect associated
with envy may originate from a fear of being out-
competed in the evolutionary \race," as discussed
in Sections 2.2 and 3 above. Envy may thus serve
an evolutionary purpose by encouraging one to com-
pete, thereby serving as a check on one's competitors'
insuciently-deserved or insuciently-earned domi-
nance.
If ego, CD, and the sensation of threat are indeed
part of a single \circuit" as proposed in Hypothe-
sis 6, then the present model claries a link between
envy and jealousy, which is dened as envy together
with fear of loss [55, 79, 78]. Although psychologi-
cal literature sometimes distinguishes these concepts,
some studies explicitly link the two emotions [55], and
Stearns speculates that contemporary usage of the
term \jealousy" for both may show speakers \viewed
certain expectations as such an intimate part of their
person that another's achievement provoked a sense
of threat or loss" [78]. Indeed the present work cor-
roborates this link, and adds that, in both cases, CD
precipitates the sensation of threat (see Sec. 4). Fur-
ther, following the prospect theory interpretation in
Hypothesis 9, either a real circumstance or a strong
expectation may be incorporated into an individual's
reference point, and taken for granted to save en-
ergy.24 Then disappointment vis-a-vis a strongly-
held expectation could provoke strong feelings of loss,
and threats to ego, just as would an actual change in
circumstance.
Another particularly painful form of envy is the CD
associated with observing another to possess some-
thing one desires, but believes unattainable. For ex-
ample, person A lives in a corrupt society and after
24See also the discussion in Sec. 4. In the case of envy,
the expectation may be based on a strongly-held self-image,
whereas for jealousy, one's circumstances may form the basis
for one's ego. But in both cases, ego is contingent on the
particular extrinsic outcome.
19
failing in business concludes it is impossible for an
honest person to \get ahead." Person A then ob-
serves acquaintance B to attain professional and -
nancial success. A experiences CD because B is per-
ceived to be \no better" than A [54, 55]. A reduces
this CD by conjecturing that the acquaintance has
succeeded through bribery or cheating.
However, A cannot feel real relief from envy be-
cause reducing CD may cause A to ignore an oppor-
tunity to learn from B's path to success, thus hurting
A materially. A is caught in a complex array of emo-
tions, including wishing B to fail in order to reduce
A's own CD, and simultaneously wishing to emulate
B's success. These emotions have a complex interac-
tion with A's ego because CD reduction helps pro-
tect A's ego, whereas emulating B's success improves
A's material situation, thus satisfying A's ego more
deeply. Based on incomplete information, A has trou-
ble deciding which of these strategies (CD reduction
vs. learning) to follow.
Sub-optimal, irrational, or unpredictable behavior
can result, as in Fig. 1. This example of envy il-
lustrates well the interplay between the rational and
irrational sides in human psychology because imper-
fect information renders it expensive and risky to de-
termine an optimal course of behavior. Viewed more
broadly, the dilemma between accounting for B's ex-
trinsic success as mere luck (CD reduction) vs. as
earned (egoism as in Def. 1) drives irrational behav-
ior in the name of rational goals and pursuits.
5.4 \Animal spirits"
Much of this work has been devoted to studying how
economics can aect individual psychology, via the
ego. Sec. 5.1 discussed how low ego can cause individ-
uals to under-invest in education or choose less am-
bitious career paths, which can potentially cost the
economy as a whole. Here I attempt to explore fur-
ther ways the egos of individuals can inuence larger-
scale economic activity in a society.
In Denition 1, the ego mediates between a per-
son's outcomes and subsequent behavior; but for the
study of large populations, it is useful to model the
ego dynamic more simply. That is, ignoring detailed
inner debates of one's ego, Def. 1 is basically an
extrapolation where one's past \performance" sets
one's expectations for the future. Arguably, it is not
coincidental that this is a dynamic similar to those of
nancial and stock markets { which John Maynard
Keynes famously referred to as \animal spirits" [70].
In particular, it is crucial to the \animal spirits"
dynamic that economic actors' expectations can have
self-fullling properties [70]. Similarly, an important
facet of the ego model is that ego sets one's expec-
tations for the future (see discussions around Hy-
potheses 6 and 7 and Def. 1), which can also be self-
reinforcing (see footnote 5 and, e.g., the game theory
model in Sec. 2.4).
It is well-documented that the aective system re-
acts to risks according to mental images of outcomes,
with little dependence on the outcome probability
[59]. I hypothesize that the resulting over-sensitivity
at the individual level can cause, at the aggregate
level, volatility in nancial markets and uctuations
in the economy as a whole [70]. Thus, both nan-
cial markets and the ego's self-assessment alike may
overreact to new events, positive or negative.
The ego model may also illuminate the diering be-
havior of real (ination-adjusted) and nominal (mea-
sured monetarily) variables in the economy. Despite
this work's overarching concern with economic risk,
thus far I have deliberately focused on real variables,
which are more palpable and thus more familiar to
the human psyche. Compared with a more highly
abstract nominal investment (e.g., a stock, nancial
instrument, or derivative), I hypothesize that invest-
ing in the real economy appears riskier to an egoistic
actor because it involves more visible consequences.
Moreover, virtually all endeavors in the real economy
depend on trade with others and on labor, and thus
crucially require the investor to trust other parties
[47, 71, 51] who may possess asymmetric information.
Yet the ego arguably discourages trust, given its
emphasis on the self, competition, and risk-aversion
[51]. As a result, the ego model may predict that
real economy decisions are characterized by under-
investment, especially in human capital [72] and in
creative [73] or highly innovative, uncertain [74] sec-
tors. As discussed in Sec. 2.3, rational choice can
break down when the ego motive, and associated
risks, become too large. Even attempting a real-
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economy investment may seem futile if one believes
success to be limited by one's own abilities (as dis-
cussed in Sec. 5.1) and/or power, or by the abili-
ties, reliability [19], or trustworthiness of one's agent.
Thus in the ego model, trust problems could exert a
depressive pressure on aggregate supply [75] or real
economic investment.
By contrast, a nominal investment is more liquid,
therefore not explicitly demanding trust. That is,
the investor may exit the investment at any time if a
desired outcome fails to materialize.25 The purely -
nancial investment may likewise insulate the investor
from any real-economy impact of the investment de-
cisions. Yet the nominal investment can still interact
strongly with the ego because it can produce prots
and losses. Thus arguably, in the nominal economy,
the ego eects of distrust and (real) risk are attenu-
ated, while the ego eects of gain and potential con-
sumption are strongly present. Therefore, the ego
model may predict that nominal economy decisions
are more susceptible to speculative over-investment
[76].
Thus, ego may discourage investment in training
and in creative but uncertain ideas, yet encourage
speculation, at least in some cases, in the nominal
economy. Historical evidence that investors prefer
bonds to stocks [1] might possibly lend support to
this hypothesis.
5.5 Status symbols vs. costly signals
Status symbols may often be assumed to signal
wealth and success. But it is interesting to consider
that status symbols often are not truly costly sig-
nals. For example, many luxury goods or designer
apparel items are in fact marketed at middle class
consumers [80]. Furthermore, it is common to spend
disproportionately on status symbols to appear rich
without being [80], and luxury marketers realize this.
In fact, such a practice must be common enough that
not all status symbols truly serve as falsiable signals
of wealth (or evolutionary tness). Instead, symbols
25The nominal investor also has the opportunity to invest in
smaller, more aordable increments, which further encourages
investment. However, I doubt that this fact alone can explain
speculative over-investment in the nominal economy.
may be more closely related with so-called advertising
\puery" or \cheap talk;" that is, it is generally ex-
pected that all individuals will loudly proclaim their
tness.
These considerations are of interest to the present
work because they demonstrate the principle of Def. 1
that egoistic evidence is extrinsic, rather than deep.
In social interactions such as irtation, designer lo-
gos and even imitations thereof attest to the tness
of their wearer, recalling the assertion in Sec. 2.1 that
ego particularly depends on sensory evidence. Even
in the case of truly costly status symbols, the em-
phasis is on extrinsic symbols of tness that attract
others, rather than deep demonstrations of one's in-
trinsic qualities and abilities.
5.6 Life stages
If human desires can be reliably predicted by evo-
lutionary considerations [8], one may presume that
an intense ego-driven desire of children is to grow to
adulthood, whereas that of adolescents is to procre-
ate. Thus we can expect the ego to reect varying
motivations at dierent stages of life. For example,
childish fears of monsters could underscore a child's
greater vulnerability before reaching full maturity.
This is perhaps well-illustrated by a passage from
Proust's novel Swann's Way, where the narrator Mar-
cel recalls his pre-adolescence, during the rst season
when he is allowed to go for a walk unsupervised.
His \exhilaration ... derived from being alone" can
be understood as excitement at being nearly mature.
For at that time everything which was not
myself, the earth and the creatures upon it,
seemed to me ... more important, endowed
with a more real existence than they appear
to full-grown men.
The \importance" referred to is a good example of
Def. 1: any \creature" that has survived to adulthood
is \important" by virtue of being successful. At the
cusp of adolescence, Marcel conates his desire for
maturity (to become like the \important creatures"
upon \the earth") with a desire for reproduction:
I had a desire for a peasant-girl from
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Meseglise, ... for a sher-girl from Bal-
bec, just as I had a desire for Balbec and
Meseglise.
Such intense feelings are typical of the life stage
in which they occur, and may appear less dramatic
when recalled later in life. For example, adults
looking back on childhood anxieties often nd them
\cute" or \quaint," even taking pleasure in remem-
bering the fears. Such nostalgia can be interpreted
as joy from realizing that former worries were un-
founded, yet also exemplies the contingency of ego.
In fact the earlier fear could even have some adaptive
function [6, 59].
At more advanced stages of life, individuals may
feel fear of death, for example manifesting as a mid-
life or late-life crisis. The present model predicts that
such mortality fear should interact especially strongly
with ego and self-image; for example a mid-life crisis
may be characterized by a desire to achieve more, and
to advertise one's \tness" by increased consumption.
Such a connection between fears of mortality and self-
image is made easier to understand by Def. 1, which
elucidates that self-image is fundamentally related to
our instincts to survive and reproduce successfully.
5.7 Self-improvement
As discussed above, envy can prevent one from learn-
ing to emulate another's success, even if it would
be adaptive/rational to do so. More broadly speak-
ing, attempts at self-improvement may be sabotaged
by one's ego, since ego may emphasize competi-
tive rather than cooperative impulses. As such,
the ego may be threatened by the prospect of self-
improvement; an egoistic response may conate pur-
suing improved skills with an admission of inferior
aptitude { or at least with reputation damage. As in
Hypothesis 2, this could be taken to imply that one is
less t than others from whom one must learn. The
ego could thus maladaptively prevent one from ac-
knowledging a problem aecting one's life, rendering
it dicult to learn to solve the problem.
This scenario corresponds to the often-observed
phenomenon that pride can engender irrational or
maladaptive behavior.26 A related impediment to ef-
fective self-improvement could be a baseless fear that
improving one's life outcomes somehow `circumvents'
natural selection.27
However, such ego-driven CD is surely an overre-
action. Of course, acknowledging another to be more
successful in a specic domain, or even in general,
does not prove the other to have a tter genotype.
On the contrary, the opportunity to learn from an-
other may demonstrate that one is capable of emu-
lating the other's success.
Thus, ironically enough, such CD is likely precisely
when one could learn or improve, but emotional is-
sues, which may themselves interact with the ego,
supersede purely self-interested considerations. For
example, one hesitates to study for a dierent career
because one fears failing in the new career, or even
due to more diuse uncertainties and anxieties, such
as that social mobility would distance one from one's
family or community support network. As in the case
of envy, the ego may overreact precisely when one
observes others who are no intrinsically better than
oneself enjoying better outcomes in life. The CD
caused by such observations can be painful until it is
either resolved by emulating the others' outcomes, or
reduced by explaining (or excusing) the discrepancy
to oneself.
5.8 Clinical and practical implica-
tions: What is ego health?
We have seen throughout this work two broad ways
of coping with ego: egoistic competition that seeks
to satiate the ego, and CD reduction functioning to
protect the ego from threats. Yet neither of these is,
26It is counter-intuitive that self-interested pride could in-
hibit choices in one's long-term best interest. But perhaps this
is made reasonable by considering that excessive ego is akin
to overcaution (for example, in protecting one's reputation),
which can also be counterproductive.
27Perhaps CD could be produced by the cognitions that the
(all-encompassing and seemingly omnipotent) process of nat-
ural selection ostensibly improves population tness, and yet
can blindly [82] contradict one's self-interest at any moment.
More broadly, the \existential dilemma" of TMT [20] may in-
volve awareness of natural selection as both a life-sustaining
and destructive force.
22
generally speaking, a consistently optimal approach
in life. Indeed, egoism can lead to risk-aversion and
the substitution of the trappings of success for truly
satisfying experiences. CD reduction, by contrast,
encourages acceptance of the status quo { resulting
at times in under-investment in one's human capital
and reactive, rather than pro-active attitude towards
threats and opportunities. Paradoxically, it appears
that either feeding or protecting the ego discourage
dynamic personal growth. A healthier psychological
framework, then, may be acknowledging the pres-
sures of Denition 1, yet avoiding letting one's life
possibilites be limited by them.
6 Conclusions
I have proposed a model of the ego as a powerful
instinct that is both evolutionary adaptation and by-
product. This model is useful for exploring the inter-
action of individuals' inner desires and expectations
with objective reality.
The ego model may help interpolate between ratio-
nal choice theory and cognitive psychology. Indeed,
the model shares rational choice theory's virtues of
simple, parsimonious assumptions and relatively ro-
bust conclusions, while also incorporating many im-
portant psychological concepts such as CD, operant
conditioning, ego depletion, etc. I have demonstrated
how the ego model can consistently apply to a variety
of personal, social, and economic phenomena, includ-
ing envy, low self-esteem, nationalism, poverty traps,
life stages, and self-improvement.
The rationality debate among rational choice the-
orists, adaptationists, behavioral economists, psy-
chologists, and sociologists can at times appear pro-
tracted. This work seeks to bridge the gap by demon-
strating how apparently complex and irrational be-
haviors can be analyzed in terms of very fundamen-
tal survival (evolution-related) concerns. And con-
versely, rational considerations can lead to compli-
cated tradeo choices and a layered spectrum of be-
havior, much of which can be understood in a precise
way from relatively simple hypotheses.
Regarding the ego model's implications for the ra-
tionality debate, a concluding thought to distill from
this work: If all humans had the same genotype, be-
havior would be driven by a desire simply to maxi-
mize phenotypic outcomes, without competitive ter-
ror of the type referenced in Hypothesis 2. Con-
versely, if genotype completely determined pheno-
typic outcomes, humans would only need to be con-
cerned with optimizing the genotypes of their o-
spring. But in reality, there is a more complex in-
terplay between genotype and phenotype, wherein
genotype can oer uncertain and situation-dependent
advantages towards improving phenotypic outcomes,
and wherein phenotypic outcomes frequently serve as
a proxy indicator of genotypic tness. In this complex
world, egoistic and ego-driven behavior can result.
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